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Contrary to the earlier findings under end-users piracy where the existence of strong 
network externality was shown to be a reason for allowing limited piracy, we find when 
the piracy is commercial in nature the optimal policy for the original software developer 
is to protect its product irrespective of the strength of network externality in the software 
users market.  
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1. Introduction 
The pervasiveness of the illegal copying of software is indeed a worldwide 
phenomenon. So far there are quite a few theoretical studies (see Conner and Rumelt 
(1991), Takeyama (1994), Slive and Bernhardt (1998), Shy and Thisse (1999) among 
others) to investigate the economic reason behind widespread end-user piracy (i.e. private 
coping). These studies provide us some wisdom on the issue of end-user piracy. For 
example, in some situations the original software developer may not want to stop piracy 
even when it has the means to do so simply because it can actually be profitable for the 
software developer to allow limited piracy. The arguments to establish this result 
basically stands on the feature of network externality that is widely observed in the 
software users market. It has been shown that when the effect of network externality is 
strong, allowing piracy by the original software developer can be a profitable option. 
  However, another type of software piracy that also considerably draws our 
attention is commercial or retail piracy and none of the above studies explicitly discuss 
about the case of commercial piracy and the impact of network externality on it.
1 
Commercial piracy is prevalent in most developing countries where the laws against 
piracy or in general enforcement against copyright violations are rather weak.
2 Under 
commercial piracy, there is a pirate, who generally operates from a make-shift shop 
(think of it as another firm), who copies the original software and sells to the consumers.
3 
In other words, this pirate, in some sense competes with the original producer in the same 
market by providing a cheaper variety of the original product. The pirate’s product 
usually is not guaranteed, it does not come with any supporting service, and sometimes it 
                                                 
1 Banerjee (2003) studies commercial piracy, however, the main focus of the paper is to see the impact of 
monitoring policy over piracy on the welfare of the society. Effects of various policy instruments on 
aggregate welfare under end-users piracy are studied by Chen and Png (2003), Gayer and Shy (2003) 
among others. 
 
2  Widespread corruptions, weak legal systems, bribery are some of the reasons for that. Also in most 
developing countries, where the computer literacy and the technological know-how are still very low 
among the average people, buying a ready-made pirated product at a cheap price is rather attractive. 
 
3 With advanced and sophisticated technological methods, pirated software copies or even copies of copies 
become almost if not perfectly identical to an original one.   2
is also not fully reliable. But at the same time, it comes at a lot cheaper price than the 
original one, and as a result consumers get easily attracted to it.
4   
Now when the nature of piracy is of this type (i.e. commercial type as opposed to 
end-user type), we want to see the effect of network externality on the existence of piracy 
and ask the question what would be the optimal policy of the original software developer 
in regard to piracy and protection. The question is interesting as we will see later that the 
presence of the commercial pirate expands the market for the original product (through 
network effect), which is naturally beneficial for the original developer. However, due to 
competition there is a dampening effect on price as both firms compete in the same 
market selling (vertically) differentiated products. Thus the question is how the positive 
effect on demand expansion of the original developer and the negative affect on price 
combine together. Our result shows that under such circumstances protection as opposed 
to allowing piracy is always optimal for the original software developer irrespective of 
the strength of network externality in the software users market.  
 
2. The Model of Commercial Piracy 
Consider an original software firm and a commercial pirate.
5  Consumers can buy the 
original product at a higher price from the software firm or can buy the pirated version 
from the pirate at a cheaper price.
  The pirate has the technology to copy the original 
software and we assume the cost of copying the software is zero. We assume the 
probability that a pirated software works is q,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ q  and this probability is common 
knowledge.
6 We interpret q in the following ways. q serves as a proxy for the quality of 
the pirated software. Usually when the consumer gets a pirated copy, it does not come 
with the supporting services, or sometimes some applications may be missing in the 
                                                 
4 Software users market is quite heterogeneous in nature. There are heavy users (high valued consumers) to 
very light users (low valued consumers) of software. Heavy users are likely to depend on reliable product, 
whereas low valued consumers naturally have higher incentive to buy a pirated copy at a cheaper price. 
 
5 In reality, there could be more than one commercial pirate, or a group of small commercial pirates operate 
in the product market, but for simplicity in this paper, we just consider one pirate as qualitative results 
remains unchanged when there are more pirates and all pirates are similar. 
 
6  0 q =  will eliminate the pirated product, while  1 q = will make two products identical. Note  1 q =  is 
never possible due to the reasons described above.    3
pirated version. There is no warranty on the pirated software.  Hence, the consumer 
enjoys the benefit of the pirated software only with probability q.  The original software 
is fully guaranteed to work.  O p  and  P p  are the prices of the original and pirated software 
respectively.  It must be true that  OP p p > .   
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by X , [ ] , LH X θ θ ∈ , 0 HL θ θ >≥ . A 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the software depends on how much he/she values it – 
measured by X . A high value of X  means higher valuation for the software and low 
value of X  means lower valuation for the software.  Therefore, one consumer differs 
from another on the basis of his/her valuation for the particular software. Valuations are 
uniformly distributed over the interval [ ] , L H θ θ  and the size of the market is normalized 
to 1. 
Assumption 1: We assume  2 H L θ θ ≥  to ensure enough heterogeneity in the market.  
A consumer’s utility function is given as: 
      X  –  O p       if buys original software 
U =     qX  –  P p       if buys pirated software 
0  if buys none 
  Next we introduce the feature of network externality. Since the pirated product is 
available at a cheaper price, a number of low valued consumers will have an incentive to 
actually buy the pirated product. This in turn will increase the total number of software 
users in the society due to the network effect. The network effect also increases the value 
of the software for any potential buyer.   
  Under this circumstance, we will consider two situations in the forthcoming 
analysis. First, where the original developer protects its software (hence no piracy is 
possible), and secondly, where the original developer does not protect. For simplicity, 
here we assume that protection is costless and the original developer can just install a 
protective device into the software that makes coping impossible. Thus, the original 
developer can choose to keep its software protected or unprotected. 
   4
3. Software Protection (No Piracy) 
Without piracy, consumers would choose only between either buying the original one or 
not buying at all.   
Thus a consumer’s utility in the presence of network externality is given by: 
U =    X  +  NP D γ  –  NP P     if buys original software 
       0     if  buys  none 
NP D   denotes the total demand of the software under protection (i.e. no piracy)
 7 and 
NP P denotes the price of the software. Now  0 γ ≥  is a coefficient which measures the 
importance of network size to the software users.  It can be viewed as the degree or 
intensity of network externalities.  For example, higher γ   implies stronger effect of 
network externality, whereas when γ   is close to zero, it implies almost no effect of 
network externality at all.   
Assumption 2: We assume  HL θ θγ >+ , to have well defined demand and prices in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution  of  Buyers (Case of Protection) 
                  None        Original 
 
   L θ         X              H θ  
 
X  is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying the original software and 
not buying any software at all: 
X  + γ D NP NP P −  = 0 
X = P NP − γ D NP   
Demand for the original software is: 














                                                 
7 Using notation “NP” in the subscript to denote “no piracy”.    5








Note that assumption 2 ensures the demand is positive.  
The monopolist’s profit is: 













                                                             
And demand is: 
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The profit of the monopolist software firm is: 
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4. Allowing Software Piracy  
Here consumer’s utility is given by: 
      X  +  O D γ +  P qD γ –  O p
8    if buys original software 
U =     qX  + O qD γ + 
2 q γ P D –  P p
9             if buys pirated software 
    0      if  buys  none 
 
O D ,  O p  and  P D ,  P p  are the demand and prices for the original and pirated software 
respectively. As mentioned earlier, q is the probability that the pirated software works.   
 
Figure 2: Distribution  of  Buyers  (Case of Non-Protection) 
      None  Pirate       Original 
 
        L θ       Y          X                     H θ  
 
Like before, the marginal consumer X , who is indifferent between buying the original 
software and the pirated version is given by: 
X +  O D γ +  P qD γ –  O p  =  qX  + O qD γ +
2
P qD γ –  P p  












The marginal consumer Y , who is indifferent between buying the pirated software and 
not buying any software at all is given by: 
qY  + O qD γ + 
2 q γ P D –  P p 0 =  
                                                 
8 Since the consumer buys original software, he gets to enjoy the benefit X and the network externality generated by 
those who also buy original software with certainty.  However, he only gets to enjoy the network created by those who 
buy pirated software with probability q since only there is only a q chance that it works.  
 
9 Since this consumer buys pirated software, he gets to enjoy the benefit and the network effect created by both legal 
and illegal users if and only if his software works.   
   7
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The original firm and the pirate compete by choosing price strategically. The respective 
reaction functions are given by: 
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The profit of the original software firm is: 
() ( ) ( )
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There will be an upper bound of the network effect γ  for which 
** 1 OP DD += . Suppose 
that upper bound is  ˆ γ . Now  ˆ γ  is necessarily less than 
2
2
H L θ θ −
  (see previous section 3) 
as the size of the market served under duopoly is unambiguously larger than the size of 
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between prices ((1) and (8)); demands ((2) and (6)); and profits ((4) and (10)) under the 
previous monopoly and the present duopoly case are legitimate. The following two 
results summarize the impact of the presence of the commercial pirate in the market of 
the software developer. 
 
Lemma 1 
The demand for the original firm under piracy is higher than its demand under 
protection, while price under piracy is lower than under protection.  
Formally, 
*
NP O D D >
∗  and 
*
ON P p P
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From (2) and (6) we have,  















⎡⎤ −− − ⎣⎦
.                                                 
 
Interestingly, we note that the presence of the commercial pirate has a positive effect on 
the original firm’s demand. Allowing the pirate expands the market for the original 
product. However, due to competition there is a dampening effect on price as both firms 
compete in the same market selling differentiated products.  
 
Lemma 2   ON P DD −  is an increasing function of γ .   9
Thus increase in the demand for the software developer due to presence of the pirate 
increases with the intensity of network externality.  
 
5. Optimal Choice: Protection versus Non-Protection 
We are interested to see how the positive effect on demand of the original software firm 
and the negative affect on price combine together to determine the net effect on the profit 
of the software firm. 
 
Proposition  
Given a choice between employing protection and non-protection, it is always profitable 
for the original software developer to protect its software from the commercial pirate. 
Formally, 
**
NP O π π >  for all  0 γ ≥ . 
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. Now given that 
2
2







 the above is always true, hence the result. 
Case 2:  
2
2
H L θ θ
γ
−
≥   
In this case, full market is served under monopoly as well as duopoly. However, for a 
given degree of network externality, when original developer is the monopolist and 
serves the entire market it must earn a higher profit than when it shares the market with a 
competitor and jointly serves the full market.                       
                      Q.E.D.                        10
Thus, we find that the above proposition is true irrespective of the value of γ  i.e. 
irrespective of the strength of network externality. No matter how strong is the network 
effect, it is never profitable for the original software developer to allow the commercial 
pirate. This result is in complete contrast with the previous findings under end users 
piracy where existence of allowing limited piracy is rationalized under the presence of 
strong demand network externality. We also find that this result is also independent of the 
quality and reliability () q of the pirated copies.  In that sense this result of choosing full 
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